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Summary
Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international 
agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
– this regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include 
nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The main parties involved 
in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials – often 
referred to as “license holders” or “operators” – and the state authority. A license holder 
shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the 
regulatory control to ensure that the license holder does. Additionally, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) evaluates the success of the state safeguards system and the 
European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
To guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the 
absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials, STUK is obliged to maintain a 
central nuclear materials accountancy system and to verify that nuclear activities in 
Finland are carried out according to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, the 
European Union's (EU) legislation and international agreements.
Finland has a significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. About 99.8% of the nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland 
reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Most of the remaining 0.2% 
is at the VTT research reactor in Otaniemi, Espoo. Additionally, there are a dozen minor 
nuclear material holders in Finland. The construction project for the final disposal facility 
for spent nuclear fuel does not involve any actual nuclear material yet, but nuclear 
safeguards are applied to the facility site on the national level already, to prepare for 
effective future safeguards. The construction project for the new reactor at Olkiluoto 
is being provided turnkey by the consortium responsible for the delivery. The nuclear 
technology and instrumentation of the new facility are being imported.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2008 continued to 
demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. 
There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected 
OkkO Olli (ed). Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland Regulatory control, international 
cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2008. STUk-B 100.  
Helsinki 2009. 28 pp. + Appendices 6 pp.
Keywords: nuclear safeguards, regulatory control, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty
4STUK-B 100
materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK 
remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of three licence holders in 2008, setting 
required actions for them to update the descriptions of their procedures for nuclear 
material accountancy and control systems for the nuclear technology and dual use 
equipment that is in their possession. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission 
made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. 
By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled 
STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards.
STUK has set up an interdivisional Nuclear Security Task Group in order to improve 
internal coordination on this topic and to act as the focal point at STUK for issues dealing 
with nuclear security, counter-terrorism and radiological risk reduction. For a little over 
a year now the leadership of this task group has been assigned to the Nuclear Materials 
Section. Two new cooperation initiatives were established among our nuclear security 
related activities in 2008: STUK is now represented at the Finnish CBRNE Task Force, 
whose tasks are to advance measures to deter, prevent, detect and respond to illicit CBRN 
activities, and to enhance coordination and cooperation between national authorities 
involved in the counter-CBRN effort. The Task Force is lead by the Police Department of 
the Ministry of the Interior. As part of the national effort to combat illicit trafficking of 
nuclear and other radioactive materials, STUK and the Finnish Customs started in 2008 
a joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project will cover updating 
technical equipment as well as operational procedures, such as data transfer to enable 
swift off-site analysis.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the 
global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: 
STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) designated in the CTBT. The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect 
data received from the International Monitoring System (IMS) and to inform the national 
authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. 
The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with 
the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. 
An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and 
able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear 
test without getting detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common 
endeavour so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
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Nuclear non-proliferation is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear materials and nuclear en-
ergy, globally. In order for Finland to have a nu-
clear industry, most of which consists of nuclear 
energy production, it must be ensured that nuclear 
materials, equipment and technology are used only 
for their declared, peaceful purposes. The basis for 
nuclear safeguards is the national system for the 
regulatory control of nuclear materials and activi-
ties. Nuclear safeguards are an integral part of nu-
clear safety and nuclear security and they are ap-
plied both to large and medium-size nuclear indus-
try and to small-scale nuclear material activities. 
Along with the safeguards, the regulatory process 
for nuclear non-proliferation includes transport 
control, export control, border control, interna-
tional cooperation and conventions, and monitor-
ing compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The following chapters 
describe how the Finnish nuclear non-proliferation 
implementation works.
1.1 Nuclear safeguards are based 
on international agreements 
and national law
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis 
for the nuclear safeguards system of the European 
Union (EU). Finland is bound by both of these trea-
ties, and also has several bilateral agreements in 
the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Upon 
joining the EU, Finland’s bilateral agreements with 
Australia, Canada and the USA were partly substi-
tuted by the corresponding Euratom agreements 
(see Appendix 4 for the relevant legislation).
1 Nuclear Non-proliferation 
implementation in Finland
Finland was the first state where an 
INFCIRC/153-type nuclear Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA entered into force (INFCIRC/155, 
9 February 1972). When Finland joined the EU (1 
January 1995), this agreement was suspended and 
subsequently the Safeguards Agreement between 
the non-nuclear weapon Member States of the 
EU, the Euratom, and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) 
entered into force in Finland, on 1 October 1995. 
Finland signed the Additional Protocol (AP) to 
the INFCIRC/193 in Vienna on 22 September 
1998, with the other EU Member States, and rati-
fied it on 8 August 2000. The Additional Protocol 
entered into force in April 30, 2004, when all the 
EU Member States had ratified it. The scope and 
mandate for Euratom nuclear safeguards are de-
fined in the European Commission Regulation No. 
302/2005.
After Finland joined EU as a Member State and 
therefore joined the Euratom nuclear safeguards, 
a comprehensive national safeguards system was 
still maintained. The basic motivation for this is 
the responsibility assumed by Finland for its nu-
clear safeguards and nuclear security under the 
obligations of the NPT.
The national nuclear safeguards derive their 
mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree. These were amended dur-
ing 2008 as a result of the general constitution-
based renewal of the Finnish nuclear legislation 
system. The amendment of the act was accepted 
by the Government in 2007 and was approved 
by the Parliament on 23 May 2008. The Nuclear 
Energy Decree and four new Government Decrees 
were approved by the Parliament on 27 November 
2008. These amendments and Decrees entered 
into force on 1 June and 1 December, respectively, 
and strengthened regulatory control. The role of 
the persons responsible for nuclear use, including 
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those responsible for safeguards, was raised from 
the Decree to the Act. The operator’s obligation to 
have a nuclear material accountancy system and 
the right of STUK to oversee the planning of and 
generation of design information for new facili-
ties was introduced from STUK regulations to the 
Decree. One key issue was to update the regula-
tions concerning the export control of nuclear 
items. The amendment transferred export licens-
ing of nuclear materials and other nuclear dual use 
items including sensitive nuclear technology from 
STUK and the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
As stipulated by the Act, STUK issues de-
tailed regulations on safety and security (the yVL 
Guides) that apply to the use of nuclear energy. 
The yVL Guides most relevant to nuclear safe-
guards are:
•	 Control	of	nuclear	fuel	and	other	nuclear	mate-
rials required in the operation of nuclear power 
plants (Guide yVL 6.1)
•	 The	national	system	of	accounting	for	and	con-
trol of nuclear materials (Guide yVL 6.9)
•	 Reports	 to	 be	 submitted	 on	 nuclear	materials	
(Guide yVL 6.10).
Nuclear materials control applies to:
•	 nuclear	 material	 (special	 fissionable	 material	
and source material)
•	 nuclear	dual	use	items	(non-nuclear	materials,	
components, equipment and data suitable for 
producing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons 
as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
•	 licence	 holders’	 activities,	 expertise,	 prepared-
ness and competence
•	 R&D	activities	related	to	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle
•	 nuclear	security,	and
•	 safeguards	 for	 the	 final	 disposal	 of	 spent	 nu-
clear fuel.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system are the authorities and the li-
cence holders. Undistributed responsibility for the 
safety, security and safeguarding of its nuclear ma-
terials is on the licence holder. It is the responsibil-
ity of STUK as the competent state authority to 
ensure that the licence holders comply with the re-
quirements of the law and the nuclear safeguards 
agreements. To complement the national effort, 
international control is necessary to demonstrate 
credibility and the proper functioning of the na-
tional safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for 
national non-proliferation policy and international 
agreements. The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE, formerly the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry) is the highest state authority for 
management and control of nuclear energy. MEE is 
responsible for legislation related to nuclear energy 
and it is also the competent safeguards authority 
mentioned in the Euratom Treaty. Also other min-
istries, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Defence contribute to the efficient func-
tioning of the national nuclear safeguards system.
1.2.2 STUK
According to the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK 
is responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates the license 
holders’ activities and ensures that the obligations 
of international agreements concerning peaceful 
use of nuclear materials are met. Regulatory con-
trol by STUK includes the possession, use, produc-
tion, transfer (national and international), han-
dling, storage, transport, export and import of nu-
clear material and nuclear dual use items. STUK 
is in charge of Finland’s approval and consultation 
process for IAEA and European Commission in-
spectors. STUK approves an inspector as long as 
there are no such issues related to the person in 
question that might adversely affect nuclear safety 
or security at Finnish facilities or the non-prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. The new inspector re-
quests are sent for comments to the operators that 
hold construction or operating licenses for nuclear 
facilities. If STUK cannot approve an inspector, 
it assigns the approval process to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy.
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK (see Fig. 1 for the organisational 
chart and Appendix 3 for the staff) cover all typical 
measures of a State System of Accounting for and 
Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) and many 
other activities besides. STUK reviews the license 
holders’ reports (operational notifications, inven-
tory reports), inspects their accountancy, facilities 
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and transport arrangements on site, and performs 
system audits. Office work constitutes 90% of the 
inspection effort. STUK runs a verification pro-
gramme for nuclear activities to assess the com-
pleteness and correctness of the declarations by 
the licence holders. Nuclear safeguards on the na-
tional level are closely linked with other functions 
of nuclear materials control and non-proliferation: 
licensing, export control, border control, transport 
control, combating illicit trafficking, the physical 
protection of nuclear materials, and monitoring 
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT) – all duties of the STUK 
Nuclear Materials Section. Nuclear safety and 
particularly nuclear security objectives are closely 
complemented by safeguards objectives.
1.2.3 License holders
Essential parts of the national nuclear safeguards 
system are the licence holders, in nuclear termi-
nology often called the operators. They perform 
key functions of the national safeguards system: 
control of the authentic source data of their nu-
clear materials and nuclear material accountancy 
at the facility level for each of their material bal-
ance areas (MBA). Each license holders has to op-
erate its safeguards system according to its own 
nuclear materials handbook. The handbook is part 
of the facility’s quality system and reviewed and 
approved by STUK.
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
submitted by a license holder as groundwork, 
the Commission shall adopt particular safeguards 
provisions (PSP). PSP are to be drawn taking 
into account operational and technical constraints 
and in close consultation with both the person or 
undertaking concerned and the relevant member 
state. Until PSP are adopted, the person or under-
taking shall apply the general provisions of the 
Commission regulation No 302/2005.
Figure 1. The Nuclear Materials Section and the Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT within the STUK or-
ganisational structure.
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99.8% of all nuclear materials in Finland reside 
at the nuclear power plants (NPP). The nuclear 
material (uranium, plutonium) amounts in Finland 
in 1990–2008 are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
Fortum (MBA WL0V)
Fortum is a partly state-owned energy company, 
one of the largest in the Nordic countries. Fortum 
operates power plants of several types, nuclear 
among others.
The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power and 
heat is located on the hästholmen Island in 
Loviisa on the south-east coast of Finland. This 
first NPP to have been built in Finland hosts 
two power reactor units: Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. 
Loviisa 1 started its electricity production in 1977 
and Loviisa 2 in 1980. The two units share a com-
mon fresh and spent fuel storage and for nuclear 
safeguards accountancy purposes the whole NPP 
is counted as one material balance area (MBA code 
WL0V). The electricity generated by the Loviisa 
NPP constitutes ca. 10% of the whole electricity 
production in Finland.
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has 
been imported from the Soviet Union / Russian 
Federation. The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP 
was returned back to the Soviet Union / Russian 
Federation until 1996, and since then it has been 
stored in the interim storage due to a change in the 
Finnish nuclear legislation, which today forbids, in 
general, import and export of nuclear waste.
Particular Safeguards Provisions for the Loviisa 
NPP that define the European Commission’s nucle-
ar safeguards procedures for the facility have been 
in force since 1998.
The Loviisa NPP site, as per the requirements 
of the Additional Protocol, comprises the entire 
hästholmen Island and extends to the main gate 
on the continent.
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Figure 3. Plutonium amount in Finland in 1990–2008.
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Figure 2. Uranium amount in Finland in 1990–2008.
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Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS and W0L3)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and operates 
a nuclear power plant in Olkiluoto, in Eurajoki on 
the west coast of Finland. The Olkiluoto NPP con-
sists of two nuclear power reactor units, Olkiluoto 1 
and Olkiluoto 2, and an interim spent fuel storage. 
Olkiluoto 1 was connected to the electricity grid in 
1978 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1980. The Olkiluoto NPP 
contributes ca. 16% of the whole electricity produc-
tion in Finland. At the Olkiluoto NPP there are 
three active material balance areas (MBA codes 
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS).
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian 
Federation or in the EU and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Spain and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence for 
constructing a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3, 
on 17 February 2005. As a part of the licensing 
process, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary 
measures for preventing proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was approved by STUK. The construction 
and assembly work of the reactor unit is underway. 
The European Commission has assigned the MBA 
code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3.
TVO owns most of the area of the Olkiluoto 
Island, but the NPP site, as per the requirements 
of the Additional Protocol, comprises the fenced 
areas around the reactor units, the spent fuel stor-
age and the storage for low and intermediate level 
waste as well as the Olkiluoto 3 construction site.
VTT FiR1 research reactor (MBA WRRF)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located at 
other facilities than nuclear power plants. The most 
significant of those facilities is the VTT research reac-
tor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF) in Otaniemi, Espoo. The 
research reactor was the first nuclear reactor built in 
Finland. It reached criticality on 27 March 1962.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define 
the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for 
VTT FiR1 from 1998.
The VTT FiR site, as per the requirements of 
the Additional Protocol, consists of the whole build-
ing around the research reactor, although there are 
non-nuclear companies and university premises in 
the same building.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored 
by STUK, mainly material no longer in use and 
hence taken into STUK’s custody. The Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) was founded 
in 1958 and is located at its current premises in 
Roihupelto, helsinki since 1994. The STUK MBA 
(WFRS) consists of the STUK headquarters and 
the “Central interim storage for small-user radio-
active waste” at the Olkiluoto NPP site.
The STUK site, as per the requirements of the 
Additional Protocol, consists of STUK’s headquar-
ters, but non-STUK premises in the building are 
excluded. The storage at Olkiluoto is included in 
the NPP’s site declaration.
The University of Helsinki, Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of helsinki (hyRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. hyRL is located at the Kumpula univer-
sity campus in helsinki.
The hyRL site, as per the requirements of the 
Additional Protocol, comprises the whole building 
that hosts the laboratory.
OMG Kokkola Chemicals (MBA WKK0)
The OMG Kokkola Chemicals facility is not using 
nuclear materials as such. however, the by-prod-
ucts of their cobalt purification process contain 
uranium, which qualifies them as nuclear mate-
rial. OMG Kokkola Chemicals has an operation 
license for storing, handling, and shipping this 
nuclear material to Comurhex in France. OMG 
Kokkola Chemicals is located on the west coast of 
Finland.
Other nuclear material holders
There are about 10 minor nuclear material holders 
in Finland. One of them is an actual material bal-
ance area: University of Jyväskylä, Department of 
Physics (JyFL, MBA code WDPJ), but in fact the 
nuclear material in JyFL has been derogated and 
exempted by the European Commission and the 
IAEA. Other minor nuclear material holders are 
members of a Catch-All-MBA (CAM), for purposes 
of international nuclear safeguards. Most of these 
have depleted uranium as radiation shielding ma-
terial.
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Posiva (MBA W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the fi-
nal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It 
is owned by TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been 
excavating an underground rock characterisation 
facility called “Onkalo” in Eurajoki since 2004, and 
thus preparing for the construction of the final 
disposal facility. While neither a license holder nor 
a nuclear material holder yet, Posiva and its activi-
ties are highly relevant to the national safeguards 
system because Posiva is foreseen to develop a new 
type of facility, the geological repository, where the 
nuclear material cannot be re-verified once it has 
been encapsulated and emplaced. In the IAEA safe-
guards approaches it has been suggested that the 
geological formation should be under safeguards 
during the whole lifetime of the underground facil-
ity. Therefore, Posiva is been required to develop a 
non-proliferation handbook, such as a nuclear ma-
terials handbook, to describe Posiva’s safeguards 
procedures and reporting system already before 
becoming a nuclear material holder. The European 
Commission has already at this early stage as-
signed the MBA code W0LF for Onkalo.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom safeguards 
in Finland: enabled by the 
state, checking on the state
The IAEA and the European Commission nuclear 
safeguards both have their separate mandates to 
operate in Finland. These two international in-
spectorates have agreed on cooperation (New 
Partnership Approach, NPA), which aims to reduce 
undue duplication of effort. In Finland this has 
thus far not decreased the number of inspection 
days and there is overlap in the Commission’s and 
the IAEA’s safeguards activities. In 2008 the IAEA 
safeguards activities were carried out without sig-
nificant changes to the previous years. Discussions 
in a constructive atmosphere are ongoing between 
the IAEA, the Commission, and the EU Member 
States to enhance cooperation and find the syner-
gies that would improve the efficiency of the three 
levels of nuclear safeguards in place in the EU. 
Finland endeavours to participate actively in this 
process.
1.4 Declarations provide the basis 
for state evaluation by the IAEA
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and 
activities are the basis for the state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol.
In Finland, the state has delegated its respon-
sibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
collects, inspects and reviews the relevant informa-
tion and then submits the compiled declarations 
to the IAEA. STUK has been nominated a site 
representative, as per European Commission regu-
lation No 302/2005. STUK also reviews the decla-
rations about Finland that are submitted by the 
Commission. All declarations submitted by STUK 
are copied to the IAEA and the Commission.
In Finland, there are five sites in the sense of 
the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear power 
plant (NPP) sites: the Olkiluoto NPP and the 
Loviisa NPP, and three minor sites: VTT, STUK 
and the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the 
University of helsinki. STUK reviews and verifies 
the correctness and completeness of the informa-
tion about the sites provided by the license holders. 
In order to confirm the comprehensiveness of the 
site maps they are, in some cases, compared with 
satellite imagery.
STUK reviews annually the information about 
research and development activities that might be 
eligible for declaration, as well as activities speci-
fied in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. STUK 
maintains the information on general plans related 
to the nuclear fuel cycle for the next 10 years and 
keeps account of the exports of specified equipment 
and non-nuclear materials listed in Annex II of the 
Additional Protocol.
1.5 Non-destructive assay and 
environmental sampling 
complement nuclear accountancy
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a state 
nuclear safeguards system to ensure that nuclear 
materials and activities within the state are in ac-
cordance with the licence holders’ declarations and 
that there are no undeclared activities. Such meth-
ods can provide information on the identity of the 
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nuclear materials and confirm that licence holders’ 
declarations are correct and complete with respect 
to e.g. the enrichment of uranium, the burnup, and 
the cooling time of nuclear fuel. The technical anal-
ysis methods in use at STUK are non-destructive 
assay (NDA) and environmental sampling (ES).
STUK employs three methods for NDA. All of 
them are suitable for verifying spent nuclear fuel. 
One method lends itself for rapid scanning, as the 
detector is mounted on the fuel transfer machine 
and the fuel elements can be measured from above 
the fuel pond without moving the elements. The 
other two methods, on the other hand, allow con-
firming with greater confidence the correctness of 
the declared burnup and the cooling time. With the 
most precise method, the absence of a fuel pin or 
pins from a fuel element can be discovered.
All nuclear materials leave traces of their iden-
tity, source of origin and treatment. Safeguards 
environmental samples are used to investigate 
these traces, which provide further clarity in es-
tablishing whether the nuclear activities are in 
accordance with the declarations. In the Finnish 
nuclear safeguards system environmental samples 
are collected as surface swipes.
1.6 Export/import control and 
licensing are also elements of 
nuclear materials control
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act also 
nuclear fuel cycle related activities are under reg-
ulatory control. A license is required for posses-
sion, transfer, export and import of components, 
equipment, materials and technology suitable 
for producing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons 
(nuclear dual use items). The list of these other 
items is based on Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) 
Guidelines (INFCIRC/254 Part 1). The license 
holder is required to provide STUK annually with 
a list of the above mentioned items. Moreover, the 
export, import, and transfer of such items shall be 
reported to STUK.
Mining and enrichment operations that aim 
to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
nuclear safeguards and regulatory nuclear safety 
control. A company or a person carrying out these 
activities shall have a license and an accounting 
system to keep track of the amounts of uranium 
and thorium. A license is also required to export 
and import uranium or thorium ore or ore con-
centrates and these activities shall be reported to 
STUK and to the European Commission.
Finland’s export control system is based on 
Regulation No 1334/2000 of the Council of the 
European Union (EC). This regulation sets up a 
Community regime for the control of export of dual 
use items and technology. The export of Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Part 1 items is regulated 
by the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and of Part 2 
items by the Finnish Act on the Control of Exports 
of Dual Use Goods. The authority in the former 
case is STUK or the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy and in the latter case the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs. In both cases an authorization 
is required to export nuclear items outside the 
European Union. A license is also required for EU 
internal transfers of NSG Part 1 items excluding 
non-sensitive nuclear materials.
1.7 The regulatory control of transport 
covers nuclear materials
The requirements for the transport of radioactive 
material are set in the Finnish regulations on the 
transport of dangerous goods. The requirements 
are based on the IAEA safety standard Regulations 
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, TS-
R-1, and their purpose is to protect people, envi-
ronment and property from the harmful effects of 
radiation during the transport of radioactive mate-
rial. Based on these regulations on the transport of 
dangerous goods, STUK is the competent national 
authority for the regulatory control regarding the 
transport of radioactive material.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material: a licence granted by STUk is needed for 
it. Usually the transport licences are granted for a 
fixed period, typically for a few years. A transport 
plan and a security plan approved by STUk are 
mandatory for each transport of nuclear material. 
A certificate of nuclear liability insurance shall 
also be delivered to STUk before the transport. 
Furthermore, a package may be used for the trans-
port of fissile nuclear material only after the pack-
age design has been approved by STUk.
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1.8 STUK contributes intensively 
to international safeguards 
development
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by nature, an interna-
tional domain. This is seen in our daily work and, 
hopefully, throughout the chapters of this report. 
In this section some specific international nuclear 
safeguards related cooperation and development 
efforts that STUK participates in are described.
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of the working groups. STUK partic-
ipates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and the Presidency of ESARDA is currently held 
by a STUK representative.
STUK’s expert participates in the work of the 
Atomic Questions Group (AQG) of the Council 
of the European Union and contributes to the 
Safeguards Experts meetings.
The Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards 
Implementation (SAGSI) comprises a group of nu-
clear safeguards experts from the IAEA Member 
States, appointed by the IAEA Director General 
to advise on safeguards implementation issues. 
One of the experts in this group is a STUK staff 
member.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts have 
contributed to the IAEA’s international evaluation 
missions, such as the International SSAC Advisory 
Service (ISSAS). The ISSAS mission reviews State 
Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials (SSAC) and provides suggestions for im-
proving them.
STUK keeps close contacts with the respective 
Nordic authority organisations. The development 
of final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geologi-
cal repositories deepens the cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden.
1.9 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty: a global technology-
based non-proliferation tool
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear weapon test ex-
plosions in any environment. This ban is aimed 
at constraining the development and qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons, including also 
the development of advanced new types of nuclear 
weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New york on 24 September 1996. The CTBT 
will enter into force after it has been ratified by 
the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states 
participated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or re-
search reactors.
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. The 
verification regime consists of the following ele-
ments: the International Monitoring System (IMS), 
a consultation and clarification process, on-site in-
spections and confidence-building measures.
Finland has signed and ratified the CTBT. In 
addition to complying with the basic requirement 
of the CTBT of not to carry out any nuclear weap-
ons tests, Finland takes part in the development of 
the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the national author-
ity is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK has 
two roles: STUK operates the Finnish National 
Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) designated in the CTBT. The 
main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received 
from the IMS and inform the national authority 
about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. 
The radionuclide laboratory contributes to the IMS 
by providing support in the radionuclide analyses 
and in the quality control of the radionuclide sta-
tion network. The third major national collaborator 
is the Institute of Seismology at the University of 
helsinki, which runs a seismology station (PS17 in 
Lahti), which is included in the IMS, and provides 
analysis of waveform IMS data (Figure 4).
1.10 Nuclear safeguards and nuclear 
security have much in common
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of nuclear and radiological safety, security 
and safeguards. All these three regimes are means 
to a common end: protection of people, society, envi-
ronment and future generations from the harmful 
effects of ionising radiation. From the definition of 
nuclear security, as referred to in the IAEA Nuclear 
Security Plan 2006–2009 (see infobox), it is clear 
that the majority of the activities that aim at non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear materi-
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als and sensitive nuclear technology contribute to 
nuclear security. Moreover, such classical elements 
of security as physical protection of nuclear mate-
rials and facilities contribute to non-proliferation. 
Within STUK’s organisation, a few of its nuclear 
security related tasks fall – solely or partly – under 
the duties of the nuclear non-proliferation process 
and the Nuclear Materials Section:
•	 national	system	 for	 the	control	of	nuclear	ma-
terials and nuclear dual use items facilitating 
international nuclear safeguards activities in 
Finland
•	 regulatory	 control	 of	 the	 transport	 of	 nuclear	
materials
•	 import	and	export	control
•	 cooperation	with	 other	 national	 authorities	 in	
prevention of illegal activities related to nuclear 
or other radioactive materials: threat assess-
ment, information sharing
•	 advice	 to	 the	 Finnish	 Customs	 on	 radiation	
monitoring at the borders, in concept develop-
ment and technical specifications; training for 
Customs officers.
•	 national	 technical	 contact	 point	 for	 interna-
tional conventions, resolutions and agreements 
against proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
sensitive technology (e.g. UNSC Resolution 
1540)
•	 participation	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 international	
nuclear safeguards and nuclear security com-
munities and working groups (IAEA, ESARDA, 
AQG, ITWG,…)
•	 participation	 in	 STUK’s	 response	 in	 cases	 of	
radiological or nuclear incidents, e.g.:
•	 advice	to	the	Finnish	Customs	on	interpretation	
of radiation detections at borders, more sophis-
ticated on-site measurements and analyses in 
response to border monitoring alarms.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) Status (31.12.2008)
•	 CTBT	Member	States	 180
•	 Total	Ratifications	 148
•	 Annex	2	Ratifications	 35
Figure 4. The Finnish CTBT organisation.
Definition of nuclear security: The prevention 
and detection of and response to theft, sabotage, 
unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other mali-
cious acts involving nuclear material, other ra-
dioactive substances or their associated facilities 
(working definition established by the fifth meet-
ing of the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security 
1–5	December	2005)	[IAEA	Nuclear	Security	Plan	
2006–2009].
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2 Theme of the year 2008: Implementing 
IAEA Integrated Safeguards
Integrated safeguards include traditional nuclear 
safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, and safeguards ac-
tivities in accordance with the Additional Protocol, 
fitted together. While this should not lead to an in-
crease in inspections, it should enable the IAEA to 
assure itself of the absence of undeclared nuclear 
activities in a state. In practice, the number of 
IAEA inspections is expected to decrease. however, 
the IAEA will additionally perform 1–3 unan-
nounced inspections per year in a state that has 
a number and type of nuclear installations that 
resembles the situation in Finland.
STUK organised information meetings on the 
effects of integrated safeguards for the nuclear 
power plant operators and preparatory trilateral 
meetings with the IAEA and the Commission in 
2007. This work continued successfully during 
2008. At two trilateral meetings, held in helsinki 
13 March and in Luxembourg 7 May 2008, the im-
plementation procedures were agreed upon. In the 
meanwhile, the operators updated their handbooks 
in order to incorporate the necessary actions for 
the new types of inspections. Also STUK increased 
preparedness for short notice and unannounced 
inspections.
The IAEA’s integrated nuclear safeguards en-
tered into force in Finland on 15 October 2008. 
The international organisations (the IAEA and the 
European Commission) performed their inspec-
tions according to the annual schedule through-
out the year 2008. The number of the routine 
inspections is expected to decrease in the future. 
A national seminar was arranged by STUK on 4 
November 2008 to inform all Finnish parties about 
the new framework.
Important events related to the 
Additional Protocol and Finland
– IAEA Board of Governors approves a mod-
el protocol 1997
– EU Member States sign the Additional 
Protocol 22 September 1998
– Finland ratifies the Additional Protocol 8 
August 2000
– Additional Protocol enters into force in 
the EU 30 April 2004
– Finland (STUK) submits initial declara-
tions 8 July 2004
– European Commission submits initial 
declarations about Finland 22 September 
2004
– First Complementary Access (24 h), at the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the Uni-
versity of Helsinki site 21 December 2004
– Annual declaration updates 4 May 2005 
(Finland) and 13 May 2005 (Commission)
– First set of 2c questions from IAEA 15 July 
2005
– STUK’s answers to the first 2c questions 8 
September 2005 (Finland)
– Commission’s answers to the first 2c ques-
tions 13 December 2005 (Commission) and 
24 January 2006 (Commission + Finland)
– Annual declaration updates May 2006, 
2007, 2008
– 2a(ix)(a) declarations submitted quarter-
ly
– Implementation of the IAEA Integrated 
Safeguards from 15 October 2008
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3 Activities in 2008
3.1 The regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
In 2008 safeguards activities were carried out with-
out significant changes to the previous years. The 
inspections carried out during the year are listed 
in Appendix 2. The development of inspection per-
son days is presented in Figures 8 and 9. Nuclear 
material inventories are shown in Figures 2 and 3 
and in Appendix 1.
3.1.1 Declarations, complementary 
accesses and approvals of new 
international inspectors
All the relevant license holders sent their updated 
information for the national declaration, which is 
compiled by STUK, in time by 1 March 2008.
STUK submitted annual declaration updates 
to the IAEA on 15 May 2008 and the European 
Commission submitted its declaration updates also 
on 15 May 2008 as required.
The IAEA carried out a complementary ac-
cess (with a 24-h advance notification) at the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of 
helsinki on 11 November 2008. The Commission 
participated in this access although the main tar-
gets of the inspection were the current research 
and development activities at the University site 
(Figure 5).
In 2008, altogether 11 IAEA and 20 Commission 
new inspectors were approved to perform inspec-
tions at nuclear facilities in Finland.
3.1.2 The Loviisa NPP
In 2008, STUK accepted Loviisa NPP’s updated 
nuclear materials handbook and approved two new 
persons to be appointed responsible for nuclear 
safeguards at the NPP. STUK granted the operat-
ing company Fortum three import licenses. These 
covered the import of fresh nuclear fuel, equipment 
and automation technology.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Loviisa 1 reactor unit took place in the period 9.8. 
– 29.9.2008 and that of the Loviisa 2 reactor unit 
in the period 20.9. – 10.10.2008. The Loviisa 1 out-
age was longer than expected. The whole core was 
unloaded to facilitate the planned maintenance of 
the pressure vessel, but a few technical failures 
mainly associated with the crane that lifted the 
reactor internals extended the outage and delayed 
the scheduled inspections. During the outage the 
IAEA carried out an ad hoc inspection to verify the 
content of the transfer cask that was to be moved 
from the reactor hall on 16 August 2008. Before the 
closing of each reactor, STUK, the IAEA, and the 
European Commission identified the fuel assem-
blies in the reactor cores and verified/item counted 
the loading ponds. The Loviisa 1 core was inspected 
on 9 September 2008 and the Loviisa 2 core on 27 
September 2008, in connection with the physical 
inventory verification (PIV). In addition to the PIV 
and the core controls, four routine inspections were 
carried out with the IAEA and the Commission in 
February, May, July and November. The post-PIV 
inspection took place on 13 October. In addition to 
Figure 5. Complementary access to verify the activities 
at the Laboratory of Radiochemistry.
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inspections performed together with the IAEA and 
the Commission, STUK identified in September 
the fuel followers to be loaded into the reactor.
At the Loviisa NPP STUK performed two non-
destructive assay (NDA) verification measurement 
campaigns on spent fuel elements in 2008. The 
first campaign, 2–3 April, was carried out with 
FORK equipment on 18 spent fuel elements. FORK 
equipment delivers a gross gamma signal from 
an ionisation chamber and a neutron count rate 
from a fission chamber. STUK’s FORK equipment 
is sometimes referred to as eFORK (enhanced 
FORK), because it incorporates a CdZnTe-gamma 
spectrometer. One IAEA inspector followed the 
campaign as an observer.
The second campaign, 11–12 November, was 
carried out with upgraded spent fuel attribute test-
er (SFAT) equipment with a CdZnTe-gamma spec-
trometer. Traditionally, a SFAT device is equipped 
with a lower resolution NaI detector. Altogether 89 
fuel elements were verified. The verification results 
were archived in the STUK NDA measurement 
database developed for the purpose. The measure-
ments and the environmental samples collected at 
the Loviisa NPP did not indicate any inconsisten-
cies in the reporting by the operator.
The safeguards system of the Loviisa NPP was 
under review owing to personnel changes, new 
IAEA approaches, and not least because of the un-
licensed import of neutron flux detectors. The im-
port was declared once the safeguards staff of the 
NPP was informed that the devices had entered 
the facility. The purchase mechanism of the NPP 
was inspected on June 17 2008. Euratom repre-
sentatives joined in this system audit as their field 
trial. The NPP quality manuals were reviewed 
with the focus on nuclear material accountancy 
practices and guidance. STUK remarked that the 
operator shall update the purchase procedure and 
incorporate it in the safeguards handbook.
On the basis of its own assessment as well as of 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP has complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2008.
3.1.3 The Olkiluoto NPP
In 2008, STUK approved one new person to be ap-
pointed responsible for nuclear fuel transfers to 
the Olkiluoto NPP. STUK granted to the TVO eight 
import licences. These covered the import of fresh 
nuclear fuel and nuclear dual use items, i.e. tech-
nology and instrumentation for the operating units 
and for the new reactor.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto 2 reactor unit took place in the period 
4.5.–12.5.2008 and that of the Olkiluoto 1 reac-
tor unit in the period 13.5.–3.6.2008. Before the 
reactors were closed, STUK, the IAEA, and the 
European Commission identified the fuel assem-
blies in the reactor cores and verified/item counted 
the loading ponds. Olkiluoto 1 was inspected on 
25 May 2008 and Olkiluoto 2 on 9–10 May 2008. 
STUK, the IAEA and the Commission verified the 
physical inventory in the Olkiluoto spent fuel stor-
age on 16–17 October 2008. In total, four routine 
inspections were performed by STUK, the IAEA, 
and the Commission, one inspection for each ma-
terial balance area (MBA) at the Olkiluoto NPP: 
in February, May, July, and October. In November 
2008 the surveillance cameras at the spent fuel 
storage were updated.
At the Olkiluoto NPP STUK performed only one 
non-destructive assay (NDA) verification measure-
ment campaign on spent fuel elements in 2008. 
During the campaign STUK performed Gamma 
Burnup Verification (GBUV) measurements at the 
Olkiluoto 2 reactor hall on 24–26 June 2008. 
Altogether 41 spent fuel assemblies were verified. 
The campaign was unique as this was the first 
time when GBUV measurements were made at the 
Olkiluoto 2 reactor hall. This campaign showed 
that the measurement and analysis methods used 
are as applicable to assemblies with very short 
cooling times as they are to assemblies with longer 
cooling times, which are typically the targets for 
measurements in the campaigns. These measure-
ments also gave good information about the vis-
ibility of short-lived nuclides when measuring this 
kind of assemblies with short cooling times. The 
results were archived in the mobile version of the 
NDA measurement database.
The second scheduled campaign had to be post-
poned owing to the failure of the electronics of the 
upgraded spent fuel attribute tester (SFAT) equip-
ment. The measurement campaign performed at 
the Olkiluoto NPP did not indicate any inconsist-
encies in the reporting by the operator.
The construction of the new reactor OL3 has 
proceeded to such a phase that nuclear items are to 
be imported to the site. The turbine hall with its in-
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strumentation proceeds well, but the reactor build-
ing is delayed. however, the main components are 
under manufactory and STUK’s regulatory control; 
e.g. the reactor pressure vessel was built in Japan 
and transported to the site at the end of 2008. 
TVO also prepared a draft for the Basic Technical 
Characteristics (BTC) of the new unit. This draft 
was reviewed by STUK, the IAEA, and Euratom at 
a meeting on 18 June. TVO submitted the BTC of 
OL3 16 September 2008. Another meeting on the 
subject was held in Olkiluoto on 15 October 2008. 
Thus, the inspectorates have the possibility to plan 
the surveillance and containment measures in 
advance. The official BTC is due at least 200 days 
before the first consignment of nuclear material 
is to be received. The commissioning of the unit is 
postponed until 2012.
STUK carried out a system inspection at the 
Olkiluoto NPP on 18 March 2008 in order to as-
sess the present practices at the facility. The site 
declaration as per Additional Protocol was also 
reviewed, but the main focus was on the reporting 
of the deliveries for the new reactor. The inspection 
confirmed to STUK that the purchase practices are 
well under safeguards control.
On the basis of its own assessment as well as of 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP has complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2008.
3.1.4 The VTT FiR1 research reactor
In 2008, STUK approved the VTT FiR1 research 
reactor’s updated nuclear materials handbook.
Safeguards inspectors from STUK, the IAEA, 
and the European Commission verified the nuclear 
material inventory of VTT on 12–13 June 2008. 
There were some rounding inconsistencies in using 
the new Euratom Nuclear Materials Accounting 
System (ENMAS) reporting, but the nuclear ma-
terial inventory was concluded to be correct. The 
inspection exceptionally took two days because of 
an urgent need to use the reactor combined with 
the need to verify nuclear materials at all Key 
Measurement Points (KMPs), as special arrange-
ments are needed to access one of these.
STUK carried out two additional inspections. 
During the inspection of nuclear material 16 fuel 
rods were measured and verified using a UPu 
Detective device in June. The non-nuclear items – 
in particular the graphite and control rods – were 
also inspected. STUK remarked that the operator 
shall update the nuclear materials handbook to 
cover the bookkeeping and reporting of nuclear 
items and equipment.
The IAEA or the Commission did not have any 
clarification requests on their inspection. The in-
ventory of nuclear materials at the FiR1 research 
reactor in the end of 2008 is presented in Table 3 
(Appendix 1).
On the basis of its verification and assessment, 
STUK concluded that the VTT FiR1 research reac-
tor has complied with its nuclear safeguards obli-
gations in 2008.
3.1.5 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2008 STUK inspected the reports from the mi-
nor nuclear material holders. The IAEA carried 
out a complementary access to the Laboratory of 
Radiochemistry at the University of helsinki site 
in November. STUK and Euratom participated in 
this access. The international inspectorates did not 
make other types of inspections to the minor hold-
ers.
On the basis of its assessment, STUK concluded 
that the minor nuclear material holders have com-
plied with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 
2008.
3.1.6 The final disposal facility
In order to confirm that the excavated underground 
space corresponds to documentation, STUK car-
ried out three regular on-site inspections at the 
underground premises of the Onkalo in 2008. The 
IAEA and the European Commission participat-
ed as observers in these on-site inspections, the 
Commission in June and the IAEA both in June 
and in November. The purpose of these visits was 
to familiarise the international inspectorates with 
Posiva’s and STUK’s non-proliferation activities for 
Onkalo and with their approaches to the future 
safeguards for final disposal.
STUK requested, as a result of its 2007 au-
dit, Posiva to update the procedures described in 
their non-proliferation handbook. The update was 
partly due to developing methods at Posiva and 
partly intended to clarify the descriptions of some 
of Posiva’s practices. The update was revised in 
spring 2008 and finally approved by STUK on 25 
June 2008.
STUK declared the Onkalo project within article 
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2a(x) of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards 
Agreement. The Commission assigned the Material 
Balance Area (MBA) code W0LF to Onkalo in 
January 2008.
3.1.7 Nuclear dual use items, export/
import control and licenses
In 2008 STUK issued seven licences for import-
ing nuclear equipment and made one statement 
to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
on an application for an import licence for nuclear 
technology. The Ministry issued the import licence 
and STUK the possession licence for this technol-
ogy used for the design of equipment for a nuclear 
facility. STUK also visited the company to examine 
the nuclear-related activities.
3.1.8 Transport of nuclear material
In 2008, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland 
from Spain, Sweden and the Russian Federation 
(Appendix 1, Table 1). In relation to these im-
ports, STUK granted two new transport licences, 
approved four transport plans and inspected two 
fresh nuclear fuel transports. One inspection con-
centrated on the arrival at the nuclear power plant 
whereas the other covered the loading and trans-
port arrangements at the Finnish border station. 
Furthermore, STUK approved one package design 
for a package to be used in the transport of fissile 
material.
3.1.9 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2008, TVO reported to STUK about its interna-
tional fuel contracts and fuel transfers. STUK car-
ried out an on-site inspection where TVO’s nuclear 
material accountancy on the fresh fuel imported 
in 2008 was verified against the original shipment 
documents covering the international transfers. 
Based on the findings, STUK concluded that TVO 
has complied with its safeguards obligations in 
purchasing the nuclear fuel and managing its in-
ternational transfers.
3.2 International developments 
in safeguards
In the international nuclear safeguards develop-
ment fora, one major topic during the year 2008 was 
the beginning of the IAEA Integrated Safeguards 
in Europe. The roles, responsibilities and practices 
of the three levels of safeguards in place within 
the EU: those of the IAEA, those of the European 
Commission and those of the EU Member States 
were discussed in a constructive atmosphere, with 
the objective of enhancing cooperation and improv-
ing cost efficiency. The amendments in the Russian 
nuclear regulation also reflected on the Finnish–
Russian cooperation programme and on interna-
tional relations in a constructive manner.
STUK contributed to the work of IAEA’s 
Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Im plem-
ent ation (SAGSI) in 2008 through the participation 
of one expert as a member of this group. Safeguards 
implementation issues considered by SAGSI dur-
ing the year were the IAEA draft version of the 
Vision 20/20 study and long term strategic plan, 
state-level technical objectives, the integrated safe-
guards approach for geological repositories, and 
the enhanced cooperation between the IAEA and 
national safeguards system.
The bi-annual meeting of the Nordic Society on 
Safeguards was held in Fredrikstad, Norway in 
October 2008. The topics covered the main develop-
ments in the field of safeguards: the prerequisites 
for and experiences from the implementation of 
integrated safeguards in the Nordic countries, the 
integration of nuclear security and safeguards, and 
the future possibilities of the thorium fuel cycle. 
STUK made a strong contribution with six papers.
In 2008 STUK participated in the European 
Safeguards Research and Development 
Association’s (ESARDA) working groups, especially 
the Integrated Safeguards Working Group (IS WG). 
STUK contributed to the 30th Annual Meeting of 
ESARDA in Luxembourg by attending several 
working group sessions and the steering commit-
tee meeting. STUK participated in the ESARDA 
Executive Board meetings in 2008 and STUK’s 
representative continued her term as the Vice-
President of ESARDA throughout 2008. At the 
beginning of 2009 STUK’s representative started 
her two-year term as the President of ESARDA. In 
order to expand the understanding of the role and 
practices of international safeguards she opened 
“The Safeguardian Angel” blog at http://www.stuk.
fi/blog/.
In 2008, the group of experts for Application of 
Safeguards to Geological Repositories (ASTOR) 
met in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA. There were two 
participants from STUK. The IAEA had finally 
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prepared the Integrated Safeguards Approach and 
Design Information Questionnaire documents for 
conditioning plants and geological repositories. 
These documents form the basis for safeguarding 
the final disposal of spent fuel. The trilateral meet-
ing between the IAEA, the European Commission 
and the States (Finland and Sweden) on the imple-
mentation of safeguards to geological repositories 
was held in Vienna on 12 December 2008.
STUK participated in the European Emergency 
Management Conference in November and in the 
discussions of the European Union Strategy for the 
Baltic See Region in December 2008. The Baltic 
See Region is by now developing to a learning plat-
form beneficial to the European Union and to the 
wider global context.
3.3 Bilateral cooperation and 
peer-to-peer exchanges 
strengthen regional security
Finland’s bilateral cooperation programmes in the 
area of non-proliferation are directed mainly to-
wards our neighbouring countries outside the EU 
and are motivated by the continued need for en-
hancement of the regional security environment. 
Accordingly, STUK continued its cooperation pro-
gramme with the Russian Federation in 2008. 
The focus in 2008 was on the cooperation with 
the Russian nuclear security and safeguards au-
thorities, mainly through peer-to-peer exchanges. 
Collaboration with Ukraine in search for mutually 
beneficial areas for future cooperation led to an 
agreement about a programme for the next 2–3 
years and the tasks identified for the 2008 pro-
gramme were started.
3.3.1 Cooperation with the Russian 
Federation continues
The cooperation programme with the Russian 
Federation included the review of Russian norms 
and guidelines that deal with the quality assur-
ance of nuclear fuel production and the accountan-
cy and control of radioactive materials and waste. 
The documents reviewed covered also physical 
protection requirements for nuclear materials and 
facilities and guidelines regulating the inspections 
to be carried out by the authority to verify the 
compliance with these requirements. The reviewed 
documents are by now in force and implementation 
support is envisioned as one of the programme di-
rections in the future.
The demonstration of the complete product of 
the spent fuel attribute tester (SFAT) measure-
ment device programme to the Russian Federal 
Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Inspectorate, 
Rostechnadzor, was successfully carried out in 
November 2008. Further use of this technology is 
envisioned in other types of facilities in Russia.
The second joint training course for the Finnish 
and Russian Customs Authorities was organised in 
May 2008. There were again 24 participants from 
several Customs points in both countries. The first 
part of the course included lectures at STUK and 
excursions to the helsinki port and to two border 
crossing stations at the Finnish–Russian border 
(Figure 6). The second part of the course, which 
focussed on technical details and practical exer-
cises, was conducted at the St. Petersburg Customs 
Academy (Figure 7).
STUK participated in the Tripartite seminar 
in Obninsk in October 2008. The seminar was 
Figure 6. Bilateral training of Customs officers took 
place at border crossing stations, here at the Vainikkala 
rail road crossing.
Figure 7. Practical training at the St. Petersburg 
Customs Academy to locate and identify nuclear and 
radioactive materials in a car.
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convened to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the 
organising scientific institute and that of the coop-
eration between the United States of America, the 
Russian Federation, and the European Commission 
that is aimed at improving the nuclear material ac-
countancy, control, and protection in Russia. The 
results of this cooperation – alike those of the 
Finnish–Russian bilateral cooperation – have led 
to the development of and amendments in Russian 
nuclear legislation in 2008 in the field of nuclear 
materials regulation.
3.3.2 The programme with 
Ukraine moves ahead
STUK’s cooperation programme with Ukraine for 
the next 2–3 year period includes activities and 
tasks in the following areas:
•	 assessment of regulatory documents in the area 
of nuclear safeguards and nuclear material se-
curity, including physical protection;
•	 specification of ways and technical means which 
will enable reliable and efficient monitoring and 
investigation of incidents involving nuclear or 
other radioactive materials or waste (mobile 
laboratory);
•	 support of the development of nuclear material 
fuel verification capacity of the Ukraine nation-
al nuclear safeguards system, particularly for 
spent fuel;
•	 information technology support for building 
inspector capacity in the areas of nuclear safe-
guards and security, including physical protec-
tion;
•	 coordinated support for establishment of a 
functional web-based information portal for 
the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of 
Ukraine.
The State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of 
Ukraine visited STUK and learned about the func-
tional capacity and technical specifications of the 
Mobile Laboratory. The considerations are by now 
underway to deliver the Laboratory as soon as 
technically possible. The functional specifications 
for the Electronic Performance Support System 
(EPSS) for inspectors were developed and the sys-
tem will be ready for demonstration during the 
first half of 2009.
3.4 Nuclear security activities rely on 
cooperation between authorities
3.4.1 Finnish Customs and STUK launched 
a joint development project
Cooperation between STUK and the Finnish 
Customs is close: in 2008 these authorities started 
a joint multi-year border monitoring development 
project. The project will cover updating technical 
equipment as well as operational procedures, such 
as data transfer to enable swift off-site analysis. 
While the implementation of radiation monitor-
ing at borders is fully under the jurisdiction of the 
Finnish Customs, STUK’s role is to provide expert 
advice. This long-standing cooperation involves 
concept planning, technical specifications and op-
erations: interpretation of alarms and analysis of 
measurement results. The continuation of Customs 
officers’ bilateral training in radiation detection is 
covered in chapter 3.3.1.
3.4.2 Radiation detections at borders is 
typically caused by fertiliser shipments
There were ten radiation detections at borders in 
2008, reported to STUK by the Finnish Customs. 
The detections were typically caused by naturally 
occurring radionuclides (NORM) in fertilisers and 
building materials. None were related to nuclear 
materials.
3.4.3 STUK joined in the Finnish 
CBRNE Task Force
Since 2008 STUK is represented by two members 
in the Finnish CBRNE Task Force (Fi-CBRNETF). 
The Task Force was established to advance meas-
ures to deter, prevent, detect and respond to illicit 
CBRN activities, and to enhance coordination and 
cooperation between national authorities involved 
in the counter-CBRN effort. Fi-CBRNETF is lead 
by the Police Department of the Ministry of the 
Interior. It has members from ten authorities and 
it is linked to several other counter-CBRN expert 
organisations.
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3.5 The Finnish National Data 
Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
3.5.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
During 2008 the Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). WGB is a policy making 
organ for the technical development of the veri-
fication regime. By participating in the work of 
WGB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), FiNDC can provide technical expertise to 
the CTBTO, while also attending to the Finnish 
national interests.
3.2.2 The analysis pipeline is a well 
established daily routine
The FiNDC continued developing its own routine 
monitoring system for the data received from the 
International Monitoring System’s network (IMS). 
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide 
measurement data generated at the IMS radionu-
clide stations across the world. The IMS network 
is still developing, and the number of operational 
air filter stations was about 55 at the end of 2008 
(in the final stage there will be 80). The operational 
stations generated approximately 700 spectra per 
day for the FiNDC analysis pipeline to handle. The 
analysis pipeline is linked to the LINSSI database 
and equipped with an automated alarm system, to 
enable efficient and fully automated screening of 
the data.
The number of IMS stations equipped with xe-
non measurement capabilities was 17 at the end 
of 2008. Although the IMS xenon systems are still 
working in a preliminary mode, the FiNDC ana-
lyzes also this data. �enon measurements are es-
pecially important for CTBT verification, because 
xenon, as a noble gas, will leak also from under-
ground tests, which seldom release particulates.
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4 Conclusions
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspec-
tion activities continued to demonstrate that the 
Finnish licence holders take good care of their nu-
clear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with 
the licence holders’ declarations. STUK remarked 
on the nuclear safeguards systems of three licence 
holders in 2008, setting required actions for them 
to update the descriptions of their procedures for 
nuclear material accountancy for and control of the 
dual use items – i.e. nuclear technology and special 
equipment – that is in their possession. Neither 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
nor the European Commission made any remarks 
nor did they present any required actions based on 
their inspections. By their nuclear materials ac-
countancy and control systems, all license holders 
enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under 
the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards and non-proliferation. The interna-
tional inspectorates, the IAEA and the European 
Commission, were able to reduce their inspection 
efforts in Finland. The application of integrated 
safeguards began in Finland on 15 October 2008.
In 2008 STUK performed 31 safeguards inspec-
tions at the Finnish nuclear power plants (NPP), 
13 at the Loviisa NPP and 18 at the Olkiluoto NPP. 
The Commission took part in 23 and the IAEA in 
24 inspections, too. STUK performed three non-
destructive assay (NDA) measurement campaigns, 
two at the Loviisa NPP and one at the Olkiluoto 
NPP. At other facilities, STUK performed four 
safeguards inspections, of which the Commission 
and the IAEA took part in the Physical Inventory 
Verification (PIV) at the VTT Research reactor. 
Also NDA measurements were carried out at the 
VTT. The new mobile database performed well for 
its purpose, but instrument failures caused extra 
maintenance and development tasks. At the un-
derground research premises for the geological re-
pository of spent fuel, STUK performed three safe-
guards inspections, of which the Euratom took part 
in one and the IAEA in two inspections. The IAEA 
carried out complementary access at the University 
of helsinki. The IAEA sent its safeguards state-
ments to the Commission, which amended them 
with its own conclusions and forwarded them to 
STUK. The conclusions by the Commission were 
in line with the IAEA’s remarks as well as STUK’s 
findings; there were no outstanding questions by 
the IAEA or the Commission at the end of 2008. 
Inspections and inspection person days of STUK, 
the IAEA and the Commission in 2008 are pre-
sented in Table 4 (Appendix 2). The development of 
inspections and inspection person days from 2003 
to 2008 are presented in Figures 8 and 9.
The Finnish CBRNE Task Force was estab-
lished in 2008. STUK is represented by two mem-
bers. The purpose of the Task Force is to advance 
measures to deter, prevent, detect and respond to 
illicit CBRN activities, and to enhance coordina-
tion and cooperation between national authorities 
involved in the counter-CBRN effort. For exam-
ple, STUK Nuclear Materials Section cooperates 
closely with the Finnish Customs to offer expert 
advice in development of radiation monitoring 
at borders, including training for Customs offic-
ers. STUK cooperation programmes in the area 
of non-proliferation emphasise the importance of 
the regional nuclear security environment and 
of peer-to-peer exchanges between the regulatory 
authorities. Most of the methods of implementing 
non-proliferation contribute directly also to nu-
clear security.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related activities 
is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To reach 
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this goal, major steps have to be taken in the politi-
cal arena, and an important prerequisite for posi-
tive political action is that the verification system 
of the CTBTO is functioning and able to provide 
assurance to all parties that it is impossible to 
make a clandestine nuclear test without getting 
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Figure 8. The number of inspections from 2003 to 2008.
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Figure 9. Inspection person days from 2003 to 2008.
detected. FiNDC is committed to its own role in the 
common endeavour so that the verification system 
of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task. 
While still incomplete, the verification system has 
already demonstrated its potential for detecting 
nuclear tests.
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6 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement con-
cerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, radio-
logical and nuclear (such as 
in “protective measures taken 
against CBRN weapons or 
hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DIQ
Design Information 
Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information 
Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment ac-
cording to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with gross 
gamma and neutron detec-
tion
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
high-enriched uranium
HPGe
high-Purity Germanium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
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IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, eg. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
IPPAS
International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITWG
International Technical 
Working Group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive materi-
als
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEE
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
Onkalo
Underground rock character-
isation facility (for the final 
disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel)
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory to 
the CTBT hosted by STUK 
(FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SAGSI
Standing Advisory Group on 
Safeguards Implementation
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SKI
Swedish Nuclear Power 
Inspectorate, present SSM
SNRI
Short Notice Random 
Inspection
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the 
CTBTO)
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Table 1. Summary of nuclear material receipts and shipments in 2008.
To From FA LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 Spain 110 19 483 –
W0L2 (1/3) Sweden 60 10 371 –
W0L2 (2/3) Sweden 60 10 360 –
W0L2 (3/3) Sweden 6 1 036 –
W0LS W0L1 41 6 783 60
W0LS W0L1 41 6 780 60
W0LS W0L2 41 6 884 62
W0LS W0L2 41 6 871 62
W0LS W0L2 41 6 885 62
WL0V Russian Federation 108 12 194 –
WL0V Russian Federation 81 10 159 – 
 W0L1, W0L2 & W0LS = Olkiluoto NPP, WL0V = Loviisa NPP, FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium, Pu = plutonium.  
 Note: W0L1 and W0L2 shipments are marked only once into the table as W0LS receipts.
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2008
Table 2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2008.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
WL0V 4 599/3 781 532 701 4 550
W0L1 1 123/551 191 751 806
W0L2 1 140/568 191 133 837
W0LS 5 863/5 863 994 990 8 298
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) FAs in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa 313 FAs and Olkiluoto 500 FAs per reactor)
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Table 3. Total amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2008.
MBA natural U (kg) LEU/HEU (kg) DU (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
WL0V – 532 702 – 4 550 –
W0L1 – 191 794 – a) 807 –
W0L2 – 191 172 – 837 –
W0LS – 994 990 – 8 298 –
WRRF 1 511 60.1 0.002 – –
WFRS 44.7 1.4 857 0.003 2.5
WKK0 2 250 – – – –
WHEL 40.4 0.3 20.0 0.003 2.5
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT FiR-1/VTT Processes, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = OMG Kokkola Chemicals, WHEL =  Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the 
University of Helsinki, U = uranium, LEU =low-enriched uranium, HEU = high-enriched uranium, DU = depleted uranium.
a) TVO has ca. 10.3 kg DU samples for training and exhibition purposes at the Olkiluoto NPP.
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APPENDIX 2 IAEA, European Commission and STUK 
safeguards field activities in Finland in 2008
Table 4. IAEA, Commission and STUK safeguards inspections on site.
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
WL0V 12 February Routine inspection 1 1 1 2 1 1
ONKALO 13 February Routine inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 14–15 February Routine inspection 3 3 3 6 3 3
Loviisa Site 14 March Site verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2, 
W0LS, Olkiluoto site 18 March
System inspection and site 
verification 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 9 April Systems inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 6 May Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 8–10 May Routine inspection W0L1, W0LS + PIV W0L2 3 3 3 3 3 3
STUK 20 May Environmental sampling 0 0 1 0 0 2
HYRL 21 May Environmental sampling 0 0 1 0 0 2
W0L1,W0L2 23–25 May Post PIV WOL 2 PIV WOL1 2 2 2 2 2 2
W0L1 10 June Post-PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
ONKALO 11 June As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
VTT 12–13 June PIV 1 1 1 2 2 2
TVO Helsinki Office 13 June  TVO’s international transfers NMAC inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 17 June System inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 29 July Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 31 July – 1 August Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
WL0V 16 August Extra inspection on cask fransfer from reactor hall to SFS 1 0 1 1 0 1
WL0V 9 September Core verification of LO1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WLOV 27 September Core verification of LO2 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 13 October Post-PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
ONKALO 14 October As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 16–17 October Routine inspection W0L1,W0L2, PIV W0LS 3 3 3 3 3 3
WHEL 11 November Complementary Access 1 1 1 2 1 1
WRRF 20 November VTT nuclear dual use items 0 0 1 0 0 3
W0LS 25–26 November
Installation of surveillance camera 
+ change of seals 1 1 1 4 4 2
WL0V 27 November LO2 camera central unit service + change of seals 1 1 1 2 2 1
TRANPORT INSPECTIONS
TVO Olkiluoto 25–26 February Transport inspection 0 0 1 0 0 6
Fortum Loviisa 28 October Transport inspection 0 0 1 0 0 3
NDA MEASUREMENTS
WL0V 2–3 April FORK 0 0 1 0 0 6
W0L2 24–26 June GBUV 0 0 1 0 0 9
WRRF 29 October UPu, Detective (+ES) 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 11–12 November Loviisa SFAT 0 0 1 0 0 6
TOTAL 26 25 43 36 30 78
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CA = Complementary Access,  
ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay.
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APPENDIX 3 The staff of STUK’s Nuclear Materials 
Section and Director of Department of Nuclear 
Waste and Materials Regulation and his Deputy
Table 5. The staff of STUK Nuclear Materials Section and Director of Department of Nuclear Waste and Materials 
Regulation and his Deputy. All section staff participate in the core safeguards tasks. Additionally, each person has 
some special areas of expertise to focus on.
Ms. Elina Martikka Section Head
Mr. Antero Kuusi Assistant Inspector Data bases, non-destructive assay
Mr. Tapani Honkamaa Senior Inspector Non-destructive assay, FINSP to the IAEA safeguards
Mr. Marko Hämäläinen Senior Inspector Inspection coordination, handbooks, Additional Protocol implementation
Ms. Anna Lahkola Inspector Transport of nuclear materials, central accountancy
Mr. Olli Okko Senior Inspector Safeguards of research and development, final disposal
Ms. Paula Karhu Inspector Nuclear security, environmental sampling, internal audit
Ms. Ritva Kylmälä Secretary 
Mr. Mikael Moring Senior Inspector Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT, non-destructive assay, 
environmental sampling
Mr. Tero Varjoranta Director, Nuclear Waste and Materials
Ms. Arja Tanninen Deputy Director Licensing, permits
 
Figure 10. Staff of Nuclear Materials Section.
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APPENDIX 4 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concern-
ing safeguards of nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items at the end of 2008 in Finland (Finnish 
Treaty Series, FTS):
1. The Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 
as amended.
2. The Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 
1988/161 as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 
1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
•	 Regulation	No	5,	amendment	of	the	list	in	
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 Regulation	No	9,	article	197,	point	4	of	the	
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005.
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 set-
ting up a Community regime for the control 
of exports of dual use items and technology as 
amended.
9. The Agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III 
and � expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
17. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(FTS 15/2001). This treaty was ratified by Fin-
land in 2001, but will not enter into force before 
it is ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex II of 
the treaty.
